

GRASSROOTS IN QUEBEC:
HOW NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND
CORPORATE CULTURE ARE
TRICKLING DOWN

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The high point of Quebec's trade-union, feminist, community, and nationalist movements occurred in the wake of the American civil rights movement, of decolonization, and of global student movements in the 1960s. The latter spawned practices of direct democracy, self-management, and popular education based on a perspective of social justice and social change. The first groups emerging from these movements, alternately referred to as "citizens' committees," "grassroots organizations," and "community organizations," embodied the ideal of participatory democracy and the ethical ideal of social responsibility. While these organizations were constituted autonomously, their political struggle over the years brought them incomplete, but relatively regular, public funding. With the emergence of neoliberalism, as well as targeted funding and government priorities based on more "productive" and quantifiable outputs, their social change perspective has been eroded and these community groups are losing their initial autonomy. As such, many community organizations are gradually incorporating managerial practices from the realm of private corporations.

In an effort to shed light on this erosion of social change practices within Quebec community organizations, it is necessary to analyze how several of these community groups have, to various degrees, adopted some of the management techniques, practices, and culture of corporations through the implementation of New Public Management methods by government. We will also illustrate the challenges that this situation entails for local grassroots democracy. This article focuses on the Quebec experience while being aware,

as indicated by the introductory sentence, of the influence global trends have had on the evolution of State-community sector relations. For this reason, our use of theoretical literature is not limited to, although drawn heavily from, Quebec, thus recognizing the specific situation of Quebec within global capitalism.

Quebec Community Organizations After the Quiet Revolution,¹ a strong and variegated popular movement emerged in Quebec in all spheres of social life. It addressed specific social problems—health, housing, household debt, sexual violence, etc.. The constitutive elements of this movement—advocacy groups—offered resources and local social services, and brought together marginalized but active citizens seeking to improve their living conditions. Some other community groups organized on a territorial basis rather than strictly around social class.² They formed national federations on a sectorial basis, and, 20 years later, also federated on the territorial basis of Quebec subregions. They offered political representation, stimulated democratic life, and systematized innovative practices.³ An example of this would be community and alternative services in mental health or in matters of sexual violence. Fighting to better the mediocre living conditions of an important segment of Quebec society,⁴ these organizations typically opposed bureaucratic and authoritarian policies and favoured grassroots power and democracy.

The project of social movements, comprised of associations, trade unions and a constellation of autonomous community organizations, is pre-eminently an emancipatory, self-managing project, based on non-traditional and non-charitable...collective solidarities. It also represents a view that opposes a bureaucratic and authoritarian vision of the modern polity. In short, it is a democratic project that affects individuals and collectivities in their entirety.⁵

Bearers of specific values and principles, these groups sowed the seeds of grassroots democracy:

[They] search for social power and...combat perceived helplessness through learning that what appears personal is often political... [They] create a capacity for democracy and for sustained social change. [They] can make society more adaptable and governments more accountable.... Community

organizing means bringing people together to combat shared problems and to increase their say about decisions that affect their lives.⁶

The organizations, struggles, and methods of popular education that thence shaped Quebec society were largely forged by these citizens' committees, women's health clinics, groups for disabled or unemployed workers, community media, citizens fighting against nonregulated urban renewal, and groups advocating for social assistance, or for the right to housing or literacy. Their struggles led to the enactment of several laws and the creation of public institutions such as the Office de protection du consommateur (Public Consumer Protection Bureau), the Conseil du statut de la femme (Council on the Status of Women), the Loi sur l'assurance maladie (Public Health Insurance Act), the Régie du logement (Housing Authority), the Loi sur l'équité salariale (Wage Equity Act), to name but a few. Community health clinics inspired the creation of the Public Local Community Health Centres (CLSCs), and community daycare centres gave rise to the Centres de la petite enfance and to a world-renowned network of childcare services. Feminist collectives spearheaded the struggle against sexual violence, creating a network of shelters for victims of sexual assault and spousal abuse. Pay equity and women's access to the labor market were also milestones of this era.

Similar organizations emerged in many Western countries. However, community groups were recognized by the Quebec State more than 25 years ago, whereas the countries that now recognize them formally initiated such a process less than a decade ago, and the scope of their recognition is not as far reaching.⁷ This can no doubt be explained by the specific situation of Quebec, torn between the need to establish an internal social consensus able to respond to conservative pressures emerging from English Canada as well as to the American philanthropic tradition.⁸ The institutionalization of community groups and of their practices in Quebec⁹ is therefore unique and warrants analysis. It has been articulated in various phases and has adopted various configurations:

(Les) règles de compromis (ont émergé) entre les acteurs (et porté sur) le financement, les conditions de développement, les (modalités) de participation, les principes de démocratisation, les formes d'ententes partenariales, les politiques sociales, etc.¹⁰

The Quebec government's formal recognition of community groups was finally embodied in a policy¹¹ that establishes the following:

The specificity of autonomous community organizations in relation to the social economy and the co-operative movement; [respect for] the autonomy of community organizations by disengaging from forced complementarity and partnership with the State; [the centrality of] supporting organizations' missions as the form of funding most likely to favor the emergence of innovative citizen participation in a milieu where problems are experienced first hand.¹²

This policy's objective is "to protect [grassroots organizations] against a dominant trend of institutionalization and instrumentalization by government."¹³ It rejects contractual forms of funding generally applied in Europe, the United States, and English Canada, as well as in countries from the South. It recognizes and funds chosen advocacy groups; this per se constitutes an "unprecedented situation in the world."¹⁴

Quebec community organizations have created and defended an organizational culture where transparency and direct democracy are guiding principles. Lately, however, tendencies and practices contrary to these principles have emerged with force and have distanced community groups from their initial stakeholders: "elite formation," professionalization,¹⁵ adulteration of efforts to mobilize and of popular education¹⁶ are some examples of this. A number of community organizations that still "represent and advocate on behalf of their members or clients"¹⁷ have reverted to stinting on genuine mobilization efforts. Originally derived from the marginalized citizens themselves, their legitimacy has been gradually transformed to a State-conferred legitimacy.¹⁸

In turn, the rise of neoliberalism, the redefinition of the Keynesian States, and their retreat from social issues¹⁹ have again put the survival of these community organizations into question:

The State would no longer be the primary social provider; the market and the community were to share the responsibility. New relationships between the community and the government were in place. Community organizations were pressured into partnership with government, and innovative solutions were sought in order to confront the crisis.²⁰

As such, many community groups were able to survive thanks to their partnership with the Quebec State.²¹ But, already reduced in the 1980s and centred on State-recognized service provision,²² their missions were increasingly tailored to the uncertainties of State grants and project funding.²³ While the revenues from these project grants have been crucial for these groups, the price paid for this uncertain public funding and formal recognition has been hefty: internal dynamics and communitarian culture have been affected. Indeed, community groups tend nowadays to be recognized by the State only for a utilitarian purpose:

This economist notion of the role of social organizations, notably of community groups, contributes to the downsizing of their critical function and constrains them to the narrower mandate of service provision. In other words, activism yields to the management of social problems. This trajectory is evidenced in a more or less conscious acceptance of the inevitable character of social issues; such acceptance leads to a new dynamic of managing social problems, modeled on the market economy. To move from activism as a form of combating the causes underlying social problems to accepting a management role for handling these problems...marks a break with the ethics of social movements that drive civil society.²⁴

Thus legitimized for their service production, community groups²⁵ have also, in some instances, been chosen by the Quebec State to formally represent the interests of marginalized populations²⁶ in various consultative bodies. They have been invited to participate in regional or provincial, social, or economic forums and processes of “concertation” (dialogue and collaboration). In turn, this has led several community organizations to mimic the practices and culture of their institutional counterparts and thus relinquish the practices and culture of the social movements from which they arose.²⁷ They have thus normalized their dependency on State funding and recognition,²⁸ and, in turn, have also transformed their organizational practices and culture. Their legitimacy no longer stems from their respective bases, but the constraints imposed by the State are increasing. In several instances, their internal organizational practices have deviated, and sometimes they have adopted those of the private sector. Thus, Quebec’s 4,000 community groups, gathered within 250 coalitions, will now sometimes exert a regula-

tory, rather than a mobilizing, influence on social movements. Deriving their legitimacy and their financial survival from a partnership with government bodies, some groups have even relinquished their original mission of popular education as well as their ethics of transparency towards their own stakeholders. Although the examples in this paragraph indicate variability across different sectors in terms of the detailed working out of the state-community group interaction, our aim in this article is to highlight the influence of some major, general themes that have cross-sector impact—albeit to different degrees and in different specific manifestations across the sectors.

New Public Management (NPM) and Community Organizations New Public Management has been very influential in this transformation of community organizations' practices and culture. Against the backdrop of a crisis in public finances and of a "commodification of social relations"²⁹ many advanced industrial countries, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members in particular, have dismantled the Keynesian State at different paces and with more or less virulence. This process has been accompanied by a discourse peppered with attacks on redistribution of wealth: it was argued that the latter, as well as the recognition of the rights of marginalized groups in society, would inhibit economic growth.

In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, liberal social government came under attack for inefficiently managing government planning, regulating, and spending, and for governing too much. Neoliberal reform came to emphasize that a 'society of commitments' would interfere with the growth and movement of free market solutions, hinder entrepreneurialism, drain public resources... and encourage certain individuals and groups to be too dependent on government at the cost of their autonomy.³⁰

This process of Keynesian State downsizing has been based upon the neoliberal idea³¹ "that the public and the private sectors did not have to be organized and managed in fundamentally different ways"³² as embodied by the principles of New Public Management (NPM)³³. "Indeed...it would be better for the public services if they could be organized and managed as much like the private sector as possible."³⁴ And in order to "replace the traditional process-based approach, which proved very difficult to evaluate

and quantify, with a results-driven approach, [and in order to institute] a system of performance enhancing incentives,”³⁵ NPM offers a set of tools, “concepts and dynamics, traditionally reserved to the private sector” which has been integrated into the public sector.³⁶ The public sector has thus taken on new regulatory functions:

The organizational regulation emerging within public organizations is based on new disciplinary mechanisms, i.e. on threats and shared fears of potential sanctions, as well as on shared chances where these changes create opportunities for individuals, which results in acceptance of this regulatory model and its legitimization. We call this model ‘liberal bureaucracy’ in order to emphasize the fundamentally paradoxical nature of the process, which combines liberty and constraints, neoliberalism and bureaucracy, decentralization and concentration of power.³⁷

In Quebec, community organizations had been involved in corporatist³⁸ relations with the Quebec State before the arrival of NPM. “In the matter of institutional arrangements, the [Quebec] State has probably influenced community groups more than [community groups have influenced the State].”³⁹ And in this way, community groups have been gradually subjected to NPM principles, which, in turn, are producing deep changes “in the labour process and in service organizations operationalized through managerial discourses [and] associated more broadly with globalization and neoliberalism.”⁴⁰ Furthermore, it seems that the PRSAC core funding program in itself is insufficient to protect grassroot organizations from this ideological trend. Social responsibilities⁴¹ are being privatized and the Quebec State is transferring some of these to community organizations that, in turn, have become dependent on it for legitimacy and financial survival. Of course, “proponents of a competitive approach and privatization” cannot alone impose a “linear trajectory to the evolution of the system.”⁴² But power between these proponents and community groups is unequal, and neoliberal tendencies are thus constantly gaining ground within community groups, as a consequence of their dependency on the State.⁴³

NPM considers governmental institutions and the nonprofit organizations they fund as business units within which managers are given discretionary power to meet or exceed program and individual goals.⁴⁴ Accountability and

efficiency are constructed entirely as achievement of performance targets.⁴⁵ The zero-deficit⁴⁶ measures introduced by the Parti Québécois in the mid-1990s and the subsequent State “re-engineering” or “modernizing” measures⁴⁷ introduced by the Liberal Government in 2003⁴⁸ altered the form and the role of the Quebec Keynesian State⁴⁹ and facilitated the introduction of a “companion”⁵⁰ or neoliberal⁵¹ State. Social services decreased, user fees increased, and subcontracting to the private sector and to community organizations was introduced “for the good reason that it costs less; [community group] employees do not receive the salaries and social advantages that unions obtained for the workers of the public and para-public sectors.”⁵² This situation in turn exerted a downward pressure on public-sector employees’ working conditions⁵³ and favoured international and subregional levels of governance.⁵⁴ It was constructed in Quebec on a “ménage à trois [between] the market, the State and civil society.”⁵⁵ In this context, many community organizations positioned themselves in the planning and distribution of public services. They provided expertise through their involvement in governance and helped legitimize the development of public policies,⁵⁶ especially when they represented a specific clientele (e.g., youth, the elderly, workers, women, etc.) or a specific sector (e.g., environment, culture, recreation). This recognition process was well described by Honneth:⁵⁷

Humans become ‘subjects’ in the sense of becoming conscious of their own rights and responsibilities only when they are subjected to a system of practical rules and attributions that confers to them a[n] social identity... [After the act of subjectivization in the guise of public approval is completed], ‘recognition’ thence loses all positive connotation to become the central mechanism of ideology: recognizing someone then means to bring him, by repeated summations dealt in on a ritualistic mode, to adopt the vision of self that conforms to the established system of expected behaviors.

As partners and subcontractors for the State, community groups seeking to benefit from public funding must satisfy certain conditions modelled on NPM principles. They are required to:

Be less accountable to members than to a bureaucracy that has its own requirements... adhere to a social planning logic based not on the requirements of

deep structural changes, but on management imperatives where the control and social peace needed for the efficient running of business, are naturally present.⁵⁸

The public sector, therefore, is opened to competition, independent service units proliferate (agencies, community organizations), and an internal market is created where contracts awarded by tender are offered to the private sector as well as to community groups or other agencies.⁵⁹ Those who respond to such requests for proposals (RFPs) can be self-managed groups of parents or of women, organized as a cooperative or as a collective, or nonprofit organizations⁶⁰ created by a public service or a private company.⁶¹ At a time when recourse to RFPs and contracts has become the norm, boundaries between public and private sectors begin to blur. Indeed, the public sector now seems to be governed by a principle of efficiency intrinsic to the private sector, rather than by those of social solidarity and common good. Services are withdrawn from the public sector and entrusted to community groups conceived as responsible citizen “corporations”⁶² over-regulated by a State that no longer regulates the market.

The community practices developed in the 1990s incorporated the formal partnership arrangements discussed above into the structures of their organizations and their wider relationships...Groups shifted from a membership or social movement base to a client focus. The redefinition is inherently depoliticizing. Clients are to be served and have a less active—or no—role in either the organizations’ internal processes or on wider social issues. At best, they are represented rather than mobilized. Thus, the form of political representation became lobbying by coalitions of community organizations promoting the needs of a particular population.⁶³

Furthermore, with decentralization the Quebec State’s control over community organizations has become more targeted. It has been reinforced through the application of a Quebec model of regional governance and of technojudicial regulation.⁶⁴ This form of governance has fuelled the “illusion of a plurality of self-governing bodies, where room for maneuver is rigorously marked out by a range of norms, which if need be, work to eliminate the extent of that autonomy.”⁶⁵ In fact, this new model of governance has

introduced a new type of corporatism⁶⁶ “by adopting a clientelistic perspective”⁶⁷:

A process in which an occupational group, which has succeeded in establishing its members’ monopoly over the definition of a particular population’s needs and over the ways to satisfy them, takes charge of the production of a category of goods and services.⁶⁸

In the Quebec subregions, hitherto devoid of these approaches, new political structures were designed to facilitate the implementation of this agenda. Underpinned “by a set of representations, forming a veritable ideology, discernible in the recesses of contemporary governance discourse,”⁶⁹ subregional governance was designed to contribute directly to the “normalization of neo-liberalism”—a process that would “be realized more easily if the actors managed to use the most important elements of the local political culture” for their own purposes.⁷⁰ It would be fair to state that grassroots organizations are an important part of this process in Quebec.

The Transformation of Internal Practices within Community Groups

The Quebec government officially recognizes “autonomous” community action and funds it as such. It recognizes its specificity in its many facets: “democratic action, expertise on various complex issues, well-trained personnel and inadequate working conditions compared with the professional and semi-professional personnel of public and para-public networks of the public service.”⁷¹

But chronic underfunding of the community sector renders these groups overly vulnerable to measures derived from NPM and adopted by government agencies, specifically agencies other than the one responsible for the PRSAC framework agreement. This is all the more true in that public services are increasingly amalgamated with community organizations on a sectorial basis. Regularly faced with community organizations’ alternative practices⁷² and with budgetary constraints, these government agencies tend to consider community groups as a solution for safeguarding public action in society. The Parti Québécois and the Liberal Party both responded to this vision in their own way. They compelled underfunded community groups to adopt

a project-defined approach; to participate (free of charge) in development planning with local and regional authorities; and created new local and regional agencies directly funded by government and mandated to deliver public services in youth employment, health care, and other fields. The territory of Quebec is indeed, as stated earlier, currently involved with community groups such as youth centres, women's centres, centres for street kids, housing committees, employability agencies, and groups engaged in food security.⁷³ By better controlling their mandates and projects, government's influence in these sectors will increase tenfold. On the other hand, rather than create new administrative structures that would facilitate its decentralization, the Quebec government has created new nonprofit agencies entrusted with government mandates. It has shaped these structures by way of legislation and funded them directly: Conférence régionale des élus (CRÉ), Centre local de développement (CLD), Centre local d'emploi (CLÉ),⁷⁴ and regional health authorities are now functional in every Quebec subregion.

To illustrate the influence of New Public Management and corporate culture within grassroots organizations, and the variety of new practices developed by community groups—often in complete opposition to past, more politicized, actions—the following four cases of situations were observed through a review of literature and empirical research but also through professional and volunteer participation in local, subregional community associations and in (Quebec) national federations pertaining to five sectors of activity. To preserve confidentiality, names and other information that would lead to identifying groups, individuals, or specific sectors have been withheld.

The Influence of NPM Management Principles Grassroots organizations are now deeply dependent on public funding. When a project is launched, community groups systematically choose to create permanent salaried positions. This is the case in particular for coalitions that define priorities for a sector or territory. It is both a cause and a consequence of the lack of mobilization and the concentration of decisionmaking at the level of the organizations' staff. A new project will be initiated only if it is financed and a new position created. Other available resources in the community will

not be considered. Innovative projects are thus associated exclusively with job creation rather than with the potential of citizens to work together at improving their own lives and communities.

In other cases, community groups have chosen to directly incorporate the NPM's philosophy and practices into their internal management. For example, boards of directors of grassroots organizations have hired outside consultants and applied their recommendations directly to, in one case, drastically reduce human resource costs without considering the group's proven and historical democratic practices. It was argued that the community organization's performance would be enhanced by such measures. The consequences were very different: this community group was re-engineered on a "performance" model, and activist volunteers and staff left.

The Influence of Regional Agencies The gradual process of decentralization initiated in Quebec has been referred to as "regionalization." Over time, mandates have been devolved to 17 Quebec administrative subregions, in fact to intermediary agencies created by the Quebec government for that purpose. These new agencies are structured in the same way as community groups (i.e., Board of Directors, General Assembly, etc.). Their membership, however, remains vague and their operations do not resemble that of a citizens' association. Board members are often appointed by authorities but don't have a mandate from the subregion's population. These members include provincial legislators, municipal councillors, as well as representatives of civil society co-opted by government. Contrary to cities and towns, they, the CRÉs, have no taxation power and no electoral process. However, they are responsible for managing the social and economic development of each subregion, whose territory at times exceeds that of England. Agency professionals and managers, accountable only to the board of directors of the CRÉs and only indirectly to the Quebec State, often make decisions internally without transparency or accountability.

In the best of cases, subregional community groups will, to a certain extent, influence these decisions, but government agencies wield the true decisionmaking power.⁷⁵ Community groups are thus subjected to acting as the mainspring of mechanisms that concentrate funding for a given field:

they can suggest projects that will be accepted, modified, or refused by the sponsors or donors; they can solicit funds within the context of “specific agreements”; and they become, if the project is accepted, subcontractors, accountable to the CRÉ and to government sponsors.⁷⁶ Their legitimacy before subregional agencies will therefore have been obtained at the expense of their own objectives and, at times, even at the cost of their own mission. In some cases, national policies have been devolved through such subcontracting mechanisms to community groups with few financial resources. The final cost of such projects is obviously less than that of projects managed and borne by civil service or government agencies. However, the mechanisms of management and accountability to which community groups must submit are now more binding than within the civil service or within government agencies.

Grassroots Organizations Lose their Critical Stance Some community and advocacy groups have moved from a more critical stance to one supporting government policies and discourse. This has happened, for example, when a group receives funding: it then integrates the ideological content of the project for which it was mandated by government. In other cases, however, local organizations or federations that were historically mandated to advocate the rights of a given population have even come to endorse a government proposal to reduce public funding in its own sector.

NPM represents one of many influences affecting community groups at this political juncture of ebbing social movements. The disappearance of global ideologies and metadiscourses on world affairs has also pushed community groups to regroup around service delivery.⁷⁷ Moreover, government legitimization of community groups, as well as their professionalization, has contributed to the disappearance of a previously preferred conflictual approach to promote the interests of the marginalized. Such a conflictual approach heralded an ethic of public debate and represented a barrier against “la pensée unique.”⁷⁸ With the disappearance of public debate and of counterdiscourses,⁷⁹ community groups are now restricted to “manage well” social issues and this “cannot occur within a context of conflict.” They also relinquish public debate or direct democracy for public relations techniques.

This tendency has reinforced manifestations of anti-intellectualism within community groups. Whereas intellectuals had held a key role in the creation of many of these grassroots organizations,⁸⁰ they are now rather absent as these organizations shed their critical role and gradually transform themselves into intermediary institutions.⁸¹ Critical thought no longer seems relevant and group practices are now based on objectives themselves determined by government funding. Internal debates generating structured or rationally constructed discourse are brushed aside, branded as dogmatism in the name of “pragmatism.” But such pragmatism is in itself an ideology held by a multitude of “micro powers” that impose norms and consolidate social order.⁸² The idea that “theory must always bow to practice...condemns praxis to an illusion [and removes the truth found in critical theory].”⁸³ Criticism is shunned, minority positions ignored, and those who hold them often brushed aside in gentle and not-so-gentle ways.

A number of other factors contribute to the institutionalization of Quebec community groups. Of these, let us underscore the following: the permanence of community organizations (e.g., several community organizations are currently celebrating their 35th anniversary); the securing of more (albeit always inadequate) regular funding; pressures from staff seeking to improve their working conditions; and demands for the recognition of their expertise.

Capacity to develop critical thought on global issues thus has been largely reduced; this is linked to the decline of activism within these groups, in particular among intellectuals offering their analytical and writing skills. The overspecialization of groups as well as staff’s surfeit of work can also explain why critical analyses of macro issues are waning; community groups are focused on project management and the search for project funding:

Most of the material actually published by community groups is wanting in political analysis. How is our sectorial cause really faring? In what global context is it situated? Can one establish connections between our cause and that of others? Sanitized texts. For a movement made up of eighty-percent of women, the word “patriarchy” seems forgotten and the word “capitalism” abolished from the dictionary...Apart from hackneyed uses of the term “globalization,” people rarely speak in clear terms, and in a spirit of demanding change in the population’s living conditions and in the methods for improving

them. People appear to have forgotten that if one does not criticize the system, one reproduces it... This lack of opposition makes us increasingly fearful of politicians. To assert our demands clearly and firmly is henceforth, it seems, categorized as radical demonstrations.⁸⁴

With no counterdiscourse and few analyses of global issues, activist leadership within community organizations is now often relegated to the background, subordinated to the immediate needs of projects and of service delivery. Admittedly, community groups still mobilize rapidly against certain legislative or administrative changes in their specific sectors: they still act as a political shield against the deterioration of social policies and programs. However, they are also increasingly playing an internal regulatory role within social movements⁸⁵ and, at times, have even resorted to antidemocratic methods to “control” activist initiatives from within their own organizations.

Democratic and Activist Practices Developed within and by Community Groups are Gradually Abandoned⁸⁶ From their inception, community groups established various structures and avant-garde management styles, conceived as more democratic than their institutional counterparts and based on participation and mutual aid. These were very fruitful practices, which of course transcended representative democracy. In this respect, the process of government recognition, funding, and regulation seriously challenged such activist, often radical, practices.⁸⁷ The introduction of NPM methods and the ongoing relationship that community groups have sustained with government agencies have led them to define their skills in relation to a system of expertise, incurring depoliticization as well as the loss of their original management styles.⁸⁸ Hierarchies and specializations were reintroduced; groups sometimes began to define themselves around issues prioritized by the government’s policies—to such an extent that it has become increasingly difficult to participate fully in decisionmaking processes within a community group short of a minimal level of expertise.⁸⁹ It is also increasingly difficult to operate as a collective or self-managed group.

Furthermore, discussions about democracy within these groups are no longer a common occurrence. When they do take place, they are more often

fuelled by the employees' perspective rather than by the perspective of activists, members, users, or the constituency symbolically represented by the group.⁹⁰ Godbout already identified this transfer of perspectives from grassroots constituencies to staff.⁹¹ Ideals of grassroots management have been reconfigured into ideals of self-management (i.e., management by the service producers or staff) and sometimes further into ideals of technocratic management (i.e., management centred on the needs of the system).

Moreover, we observe the emergence of an *omerta* that preserves this very illusion that community groups inherently defend the interests of all underprivileged constituencies. But in reality, if the democratic practices of certain community groups are still alive and well, they have often markedly eroded. The ideal of social change within several Quebec community organizations seems to have masked this erosion. But internal democracy is indeed in constant need of refurbishing.⁹² Ever since the disappearance of class analysis, the formation of community group elites has, for all intents and purposes, disappeared as a theme from literature and discourse; but the phenomenon has not vanished and is being reproduced.

Sites of advocacy have always welcomed individuals from the middle class and of radical, revolutionary, or reformist beliefs. Some among them are also willing to devote their career to the community group milieu as full-time community activists:

The spokespersons of the movement are not elected, except on rare occasions. These persons are, most often, employees of Boards of Directors, themselves [sometimes], composed of coalition employees... In this way, many executive directors have occupied their positions for ten or fifteen years. This is a vast movement and a very small world.⁹³

This structural characteristic can distance a community group and its full-time staff from its constituency. The multiplication of staff positions can reinforce a hierarchy between staff and volunteers. The possibility of representing a constituency external to the community group can favour the creation of a community elite, endowed with representative functions, as is the case in political parties and trade unions.

With this consequence, in many community groups activism has lost its

political venue and has been transformed into voluntary work. Often “managed” by staff, activism is no longer at the core of groups’ action and can even disappear from discourse; seldom mentioned in annual reports, it is easily amalgamated with the work accomplished by staff. Rarely recognized as expertise or political work, activism is now converted into “help” granted to the group’s staff members, who are chronically overburdened. Activism remains central to the group’s mission as compensation for its weak human and financial resources rather than as citizen participation. Activist contributions within community groups are more and more limited to board-of-director membership, services production, or operationalization of action plans, which in turn correspond to projects financed by government. As such, community activism within these groups increasingly resembles volunteer work performed within charitable organizations or the private sector.

Conclusion Within welfare systems, as in Quebec, social issues have become phenomena to be managed: for this, the State has reverted to methods and technobureaucratic resources. Neoliberalism has reinforced this tendency through mechanisms such as governance and subregional decentralization. At the same time, it has incorporated a philosophy and methods inspired by the private sector, subsequently transmitting them to community groups to which it grants mandates and funding. Even if some community groups have been wary of these practices, they have few means of resisting and have too often fallen prey to them.⁹⁴

Of course, Quebec community groups have extended, and continue to extend, democratic practices beyond the electoral process and party politics. Quebec’s community organizations have been central to its social safety net and have instituted numerous reforms enabling the redistribution of wealth and greater equality. They have allowed individuals and marginalized groups to position themselves as political subjects. With little means and often at the cost of bitter struggles to uphold the dignity of the socially and economically marginalized, they have contributed, and still do contribute, to social services, policies, and legislation. Finally, they still channel some of the creative ebullience of social solidarity, and do not wait for experts or persons

mandated by government to look into their situation.⁹⁵ Today, many community groups are fighting the tendency to privatize and to depoliticize social issues described in this article; they help create “polemical communities” that assert opinions diverging from the official point of view.⁹⁶ But too often, economic elites consider the solidarity organized by social movements to be detrimental—they distrust the “political involvement of groups and ‘popular’ organizations”⁹⁷; they resort to different means to stifle it, to “discipline it, neutralize or replace it with impersonal mechanisms [which cannot achieve anything other than emptying society of its] capacity to act and begin defining spaces of humanization.”⁹⁸

Technobureaucratic management imposes within community groups a greater conformity to government authorities, which in turn adopt private-sector practices and discourses. The end result is an erosion of community action as the groups’ democratic structures and practices gradually disappear. This, in turn, has a major impact on democracy within Quebec society. Indeed, as critics from within say:

Community action [is an] essential component of democratic action—democracy being above all a particular way of acting on social reality. However, the latter is characterized by conflictual social relations and by the fact that relations of power are constantly interfering. What is at stake in democracy is the mobilization of individuals as subjects and as social actors, conscious of their common responsibilities and of their power in human affairs to engage in collective and coordinated action.⁹⁹

The transformation of community groups’ culture and practices also sets up a normative standard on their production that is all the more latent because it is not the subject of discussion. For example, antipoverty work is too often insidiously transformed to work “on the poor” or, best case, “work accompanying the poor,” as noted by community activists:

The obvious example of such a slippage is the work of the Collectif pour l’élimination de la pauvreté in recent years. The Collectif’s proposal projected a solution that seemed all the more interesting in that it combined legal and expert technicity to reduce poverty, without however attacking the root of the problem. In doing so, it presented an image of a society able to expunge its

ills through rational and consensual action, which underpins the illusion of a society reconciled through repairing its social fractures. Such a reconciled society is a pure fantasy...¹⁰⁰

In this way, neoliberalism is being normalized, and one means of reaching this normalization is to proceed through local and regional actors that “manipulate the elements of local political culture.” Neoliberalism “thus no longer appears as an exogenous force...but as the new norm.”¹⁰¹

This reappropriation by the State and the economic elite of the democratic principles so dear to the socio-political movements opposing neoliberalism would thus suggest a normalization of neoliberalism.¹⁰²

This process is indeed not irrevocable, but it is nonetheless expanding and consolidating. There are counterexamples, of course: new types of collective action, new structures and practices that are suggestive of tomorrow’s democratic action. But generally speaking, we can conclude that old models are failing, and this might well include the actual Quebec model of grassroots organizations.

Activism is regenerating itself through networks parallel to “official” community group networks. Material resources or access to public spaces for these networks¹⁰³ are limited, as are their financial and political dependency. These new networks and new forms of activism attract a younger generation of activists. Will they succeed in their efforts to mobilize the marginalized? Will they be able to generate independent resources as well as a radical critique of neoliberal governance and its influence on grassroots? Only time will tell.

Notes

This article was submitted prior to the 2012 Quebec student movement, or “*printemps érable*.”

1. This refers to Quebec’s intensive period of modernization, which took place after 1960. The Quebec welfare state emerged at this point.
2. D. Lamoureux and J. Lamoureux, “Histoire et tensions d’un mouvement,” *Revue Relations* 731 (2009), pp. 15–17. See also J. Gagné, *Les organismes communautaires au Québec: une sociologie de la mémoire*, PhD diss. (Montreal: Université du Québec à Montréal, 2008).
3. Lamoureux and Lamoureux, “Histoire et tensions.”
4. H. Lamoureux, *Les dérivés de la démocratie—questions à la société civile québécoise* (Montréal: VLB, 1999), p. 12.

5. H. Lamoureux, *Les dérives de la démocratie*, p. 23.
6. H. J. Rubin and I.S. Rubin, *Community Organizing and Community Development* (New York: MacMillan, 1992), pp. 1, 3.
7. L. Guay and D. White, "Une politique novatrice sous observation," *Revue Relations* 731 (2009), pp. 19–21.
8. Ibid.
9. M. D'amours, "Procès d'institutionnalisation de l'économie sociale au Québec" (Montréal: CRISES, 2000); B. Lévesque and Y. Vaillancourt, "*Les services de proximité au Québec: de l'expérimentation à l'institutionnalisation*" (Montréal: CRISES, 1998); D. Bourque, "Trajectoire de l'organisation communautaire professionnelle," *Nouvelles pratiques sociales* 10/1 (1997), pp. 59–70.
10. M. D'amours, "Procès d'institutionnalisation," p. 2.
11. The Quebec government's policy on the recognition of autonomous community organizations, or Politique de reconnaissance et de soutien de l'action communautaire (PRSAC).
12. Guay and White, "Une politique novatrice," p. 20.
13. D. White, *Can Advocacy Survive Partnership? Representing Clients of the Welfare State*. Paper presented to International Sociological Association Research Committee 19 (Stockholm, 2008), p. 95.
14. Guay and White, "Une politique novatrice"; D. White, *La gouvernance intersectorielle à l'épreuve, Évaluation des premières retombées de la mise en œuvre de la Politique de reconnaissance de l'action communautaire* (Montreal: Université de Montréal, March 2008).
15. C. Jetté, *Les organisations communautaires et la transformation de l'État-Providence* (Québec: Presses de l'Université du Québec, 2008); H. Lamoureux, *Les dérives de la démocratie*; D. Lamoureux, "Le dilemme entre politiques et pouvoir," *Cahiers de recherche sociologique* 37 (2002), pp. 283–201.
16. C. Jetté, *Les organisations communautaires*.
17. E. Shragge, *Activism and Social Change: Lessons for Community and Local Organizing Action* (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2003), p. 31.
18. Started during the Rochon Commission in 1988, this formal recognition of Quebec community groups culminated in 2001 with the PRSAC, which recognizes their "self management" and their "autonomy" without however recognizing these groups as "autonomous democratic spaces." "Mouvement d'éducation populaire et d'action communautaire du Québec," *Bulletin spécial* (Montréal: MEPACQ, 6 December 2004); J. Rochon, *Rapport de la Commission d'enquête sur la santé et les services sociaux* (Québec: Publications du Québec, 1988).
19. J.-L. Klein, "De l'État-providence à l'État accompagnateur dans la gestion du social: le cas du développement régional au Québec," *Lien social et politiques* 33 (1995).
20. E. Shragge, *Activism and Social Change*, p. 31.
21. D. Côté, and É. Simard, "De l'utopie radicale à la bonne gouvernance: le cas du Québec," *AmeriQuests* 7/1 (2010), pp. 42–53.
22. The more radical groups, which focused on methods of radical or direct action (the right to abortion, for instance) or on less socially or politically profitable issues (radical theatre, for example), quietly disappeared. D. Lamoureux, "Les services féministes; de l'autonomie à l'extension de l'État-Providence," *Nouvelles pratiques sociales* 3/2 (1990), pp. 33–43.
23. C. Jetté, *Les organisations communautaires*.
24. H. Lamoureux, *Les dérives de la démocratie*, p. 13–14.
25. This legitimacy led them to manage certain sectors of social intervention such as employment, social housing, community economic development, the new social economy, domestic violence, and sexual violence, to cite but these examples. M.-A. Houle, "Splendeurs et misères de l'autonomie. Les relations entre le communautaire et l'État," *À Babord!* 15 (2006).
26. D. Côté and E. Simard, "De l'utopie radicale à la bonne gouvernance."
27. Such institutional isomorphism has been described by Canivenc for cooperatives. S. Canivenc, "La dégénérescence des organisations autogérées: d'un constat d'échec à l'émergence de nouvelles perspectives," *ARPES* <http://www.arpes.fr/index.php?id=182> (mis à jour le 16 April 2010).

28. This funding is increasingly linked to subcontracting relations within the sphere of social services.
29. J.-P. Villeneuve, *Citoyens, clients et usagers face à l'administration publique: Les balises d'une relation difficile* (Lausanne: Working paper de l'IDHEAP, UER: Management et marketing public, 2005), p. 7.
30. S. Ilcan, "Privatizing Responsibility: Public Sector Reform under Neoliberal Government," *Canadian Review of Sociology* 46/3, (2009), pp. 207–234. See p. 211.
31. "The neoliberal orthodoxy can be represented as a generalized belief that the State and its interventions are obstacles to economic and social development. This belief may be broken down into a number of more specific propositions: that public deficits are intrinsically negative; that State regulation of the labor market produces rigidities and hinders both economic growth and job creation; that the social protection guaranteed by the Welfare State and its redistributive policies hinders economic growth; and that the State should not intervene in regulating foreign trade or international financial markets." D. Clark, "Neoliberalism and Public Service Reform: Canada in Comparative Perspective," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 35/4 (2002), p. 771.
32. S. Dawson and C. Dargie, "New Public Management: A discussion with Special Reference to UK Health," in Kate McLaughlin, Stephen P. Osborne, and Ewan Ferlie, (eds.), *New Public Management* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 35.
33. D. Giauque, "New Public Management and Organizational Regulation: The Liberal Bureaucracy," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 69 (2003), pp. 567–592. See also F.-X. Merrien, "La Nouvelle Gestion publique: un concept mythique," *Lien social et Politiques* 41 (1999), pp. 95–103; and D. O'Brien, "Post-Bureaucracy or Post-Public Good? New Public Management and the Policy Process Constraints in Ontario," Working Paper of the Canadian Political Science Association (2 June 2006).
34. S. Dawson and C. Dargie, "New Public Management," p. 35.
35. D. Brunelle, P.-A. Harvey, and S. Bédard, "La Nouvelle gestion publique en contexte," in D. Brunelle, (ed.), *Main basse sur l'État: Les partenariats public-privé au Québec et en Amérique du Nord* (Montréal: Fides, 2005), p. 36.
36. J. P. Villeneuve, *Citoyens, clients et usagers*, p. 7.
37. D. Giauque, "New Public Management," p. 567.
38. By corporatism, we refer to "a system of representing interests in which the constitutive units are organized in a limited number of singular, obligatory, non-competitive categories, recognized or agreed upon—if not created—by the State and to which has been guaranteed a deliberate monopoly of representation within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain rules in selecting leaders and articulating demands and interests" (G.L. Bourque, *Le néo-corporatisme comme angle d'analyse de la nouvelle politique industrielle au Québec* (Montréal: Cahiers du CRISES, 1995, p.14). The tendency towards corporatism in Quebec dates back to the period when the Church was responsible for the governance of civil society and controlled union organizations. It was a social corporatism that promoted "the harmonizing of interests between employers and workers within intermediary bodies" (L. Côté, B. Lévesque, and G. Morneau, "L'évolution du modèle québécois de gouvernance: le point de vue des acteurs," *Politique et sociétés* 26/1 (2007), p. 11. The neocorporatism that we know today appeared subsequently, during the secularization of Quebec institutions: unions and employers became "conflictual partners" within the State, working together to build a national economy, organizing themselves independently, and "calling upon the State to define an institutional framework that facilitates the negotiation of social demands and conflict regulation along the lines of Scandinavian countries" (Côté, Lévesque, and Morneau, "L'évolution du modèle québécois," p. 11).
39. C. Jetté, *Les organisations communautaires*, p. 343.
40. D. Baines, "Pro-market, non-market: the dual nature of organizational change in social services delivery," *Critical Social Policy* 24/1 (2004), p. 6. See also D. Baines, "If You Could Change One Thing: Social Service Workers and Restructuring," *Australian Social Work* 59/1 (2006), pp. 20–34; D. Baines, "Caring for Nothing: Work Organization and Unwaged Labour in

- Social Services," *Work, Employment and Society* 18/2 (2004), pp. 267–295; and R. Basu, "The Rationalization of Neoliberalism in Ontario's Public Education System, 1995–2000," *Geoforum* 35 (2004), pp. 621–634.
41. S. Ilcan, "Privatizing Responsibility: Public Sector Reform under Neoliberal Government," *Canadian Review of Sociology* 46/3, (2009), pp. 207–234.
 42. C. Jetté, *Les organisations communautaires*, p. 346.
 43. For example, in a February 2011 version of another public funding program for community groups by the Department of Health and Social Services—the "Programme de soutien aux organismes communautaires (PSOC)"—the Government of Quebec introduced new controls for community groups delivering services in the health and welfare sector and who receive core funding. These controls are inspired by NPM: unilateral, unannounced, and unjustified governmental inspections and oversight, obligation for community groups to demonstrate that their service delivery is "compatible with the common values of Québec society," etc. An important opposition campaign was organized in the spring of 2011 by various national and regional coalitions or community groups and the reform was abandoned.
 44. Another recent example of this is the following: a new governmental proposal to review the Quebec Civil Code regarding corporate law will affect not-for-profit organizations (NFPO) by introducing a template inspired by private corporations. The new law would introduce the following changes: (a) the possibility for a sole individual to create a NFPO and constitute by himself the board of directors of such a NFPO—this will eliminate the collective nature of NFPOs; (b) the possibility for businesses or public institutions to create NFPOs—this will cloud the nature of NFPOs, which, up until now, clearly emanated from civil society rather than the private sector (companies) or the public sector (institutions); (c) Greater powers of boards of directors to modify internal rules and regulations of a NFPO, which, up until now, could be modified only by an AGM—this is presently the case for private corporations.
 45. D. Baines, "Pro-market, non-market: The Dual Nature of Organizational Change in Social Services Delivery," *Critical Social Policy* 24/1 (2004), p. 7.
 46. In 1996, the legislation on "zero-deficit" was adopted following "summits" that involved, for community group coalitions, working with government's economic partners from the private sector. This legislation established "deficit ceilings" for each fiscal year. G. Belzile, "Le déficit zéro, enfin! Et après?" *Québec 2000* (Montréal: Fides, 1999), p. 366. Its application principally targeted reductions in public services.
 47. C. Rouillard et al., *De la réingénierie à la modernisation de l'État québécois* (Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 2008).
 48. Re-engineering is defined as "the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed." M. Hammer and J. Champy, *Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution* (New York: Harper Business, 1993), p. 32.
 49. "Thus, governments have since then increasingly loathed to intervene as planners; rather they do so in partnership with the private sector, or with the social economy sector. In this context, governments are called upon to play the catalytic role that facilitates the proliferation of agreements between economic and non-economic partners. As a result, public intervention in the economy does not disappear, but its role is transformed. In this respect, the recognition of civil society in economic development plays a central role: it ensues both from demands formulated by the economic actors and in particular by corporations, which act increasingly as stakeholders in a host of areas and cases, and from demands stemming from other social actors." Brunelle, Harvey, and Bédard, "La Nouvelle gestion public," pp. 30–31.
 50. J.-L. Klein, "De l'État-providence à l'État accompagnateur," pp. 133–141.
 51. G. Bourque, J. Duchastel, and É. Pineault, "L'incorporation de la citoyenneté," *Sociologie et sociétés* 31/2 (1999), pp. 41–64.
 52. J.-M. Piorre, *L'État social et l'action communautaire autonome*, edited by the committee Gouvernance de l'État du RQ-ACA (Montréal: RQACA, 2010).

53. H. Lamoureux, *La pratique de l'action communautaire autonome* (Québec: Presses de l'Université du Québec, 2010).
54. B. Jouve, "La démocratie en métropoles: gouvernance, participation et citoyenneté," *Revue française de science politique* 55/2 (Avril 2005), pp. 317–337.
55. B. Lévesque, *Fonction de base et nouveau rôle des pouvoirs publics: vers un nouveau paradigme* (Montréal: CRISES 2002), p. 9.
56. M.-H. Bacqué, H. Rey, and Y. Syntomer, *Gestion de proximité et démocratie participative. Une perspective comparative* (Paris: La Découverte, 2005).
57. A. Honneth, *La société du mépris. Vers une nouvelle Théorie critique* (Paris: La Découverte, 2006), p. 246.
58. H. Lamoureux, *Les dérives de la démocratie*, p. 32.
59. G. A. Lebel, "Du salariat au précaire en milieu communautaire: les partenariats public-communautaire," *À Babord!* 30 (2009).
60. In Quebec, a nonprofit organization is a corporation regulated by the "Loi sur les compagnies" (Corporations Act). It is non-governmental, autonomous and voluntary, and does not share out profits. L. Ramboarisata and A. De Serres, *Les partenariats entreprises / OBNL du Québec dans le cadre de la mise en oeuvre de la stratégie de responsabilité sociale des entreprises* (Montréal: ARUC-ÉS, 2007), p. 11.
61. G. A. Lebel, "Du salariat au précaire."
62. G.A. Lebel, "Du salariat au précaire."
63. E. Shragge, *Activism and Social Change*, p. 55.
64. G. Bourque, J. Duchastel, and É. Pineault, "L'incorporation de la citoyenneté."
65. H. Lamoureux, *Les dérives de la démocratie*, p. 31.
66. Côté and Simard, "De l'utopie radicale à la bonne gouvernance."
67. H. Lamoureux, *Les dérives de la démocratie*, p. 26.
68. G. Paquet, *Santé et image sociale: un problème de distance culturelle* (Québec: INRS, 1989), p. 100.
69. J. Chevalier, "La gouvernance, un nouveau paradigme étatique?," *Revue française d'administration publique*, 1-2/105-106 (2003), p. 206.
70. J.-A. Boudreau and R. Keil, "La réconciliation de la démocratie locale et de la compétitivité internationale dans le discours réformiste à Toronto: Essai d'interprétation sur le néolibéralisme normalisé," *Politique et Sociétés* 25/1 (2006), p. 98.
71. M.-A. Houle, "Splendeurs et misères de l'autonomie."
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Conférence régionale des élus (CRÉ), Centre local de développement (CLD), Centre local d'emploi (CLÉ).
75. D. Côté and C. Tremblay-Fournier, "Le défi de l'égalité en contexte de développement régional au Québec," *Recherches féministes* 24/2 (2011), pp. 97–114. See also D. Masson, "Gouvernance partagée, associations et démocratie: les femmes dans le développement régional," *Politique et société* 20/2–3 (2001), pp. 89–115.
76. D. Côté and C. Tremblay-Fournier, "Le défi de l'égalité."
77. S.R. Smith, and M. Lipsky, *Non-Profits for Hire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
78. The expression "*pensée unique*" can be translated literally into English as "single thought." Coined in 1995 by Ignacio Ramonet, editor-in-chief of *Le Monde diplomatique*, it refers to the enforced reduction of political discussion by mainstream politics.
79. N. Fraser, *Qu'est-ce que la justice sociale? Reconnaissance et distribution* (Paris: La Découverte, 2005).
80. J.-M. Pirotte, *La pensée politique de Gramsci* (Montréal: Lux, 2010), p. 34.
81. N. Laurin-Frenette, "Le démantèlement des institutions intermédiaires de la régulation sociale. Vers une nouvelle forme de domination," *Sociologie et sociétés* XXXI/2 (1999): 65–72.
82. M. Foucault, *La volonté de savoir: Droit de mort et pouvoir sur la vie* (Paris: Gallimard, 2006).
83. T.W. Adorno, *Modèles critiques* (Paris: Payot, 1984), p. 283.
84. C. Brouillard, "Constitution d'un mouvement," *À Babord!* 10 (2005).

85. D. Côté and E. Simard, "De l'utopie radicale à la bonne gouvernance."
86. It is noteworthy that the 2012 Quebec student mobilization emerged from without and not from within these structures.
87. N. Guberman, J. Lamoureux, J. Beeman, D. Fournier, and L. Gervais, *Le défi des pratiques démocratiques dans les groupes de femmes* (Montréal: Éditions St-Martin, 2004).
88. M.-A. Couillard and G. Côté, "Les défis d'une interface: les groupes de femmes et le réseau de la santé et des services sociaux de la région de Québec," *Recherches féministes* 42/2, pp. 29–49.
89. P. Hamel, "Les services urbains: le défi du partenariat pour le milieu communautaire," *Les cahiers de géographie du Québec* 35/95 (1991), pp. 257–283.
90. N. Guberman et al., *Le défi des pratiques démocratiques*.
91. J.T. Godbout, "Ce qui se passe aux frontières de l'État et de la société," *Politique* 19 (1991), pp. 67–79.
92. D. Côté, "L'animation sociale au sein de comités de citoyens de l'Assemblée générale de l'Île de Hull (AGIH)," (Ottawa: Master's thesis, University of Ottawa, Department of Political Science, 1975).
93. M.-A. Houle, "Splendeurs et misères de l'autonomie."
94. A. Choudry and E. Shragge, "Disciplining Dissent: NGOs and Community Organizations," *Globalisations* 8/4, (2011), pp. 503–517.
95. J.-C. Ravet, "Quel avenir pour l'action communautaire?" *Revue Relations* 731 (2009), pp. 10–11.
96. Lamoureux and Lamoureux, "Histoire et tensions," pp. 15–17.
97. Brunelle, Harvey and Bédard, "La Nouvelle gestion publique," p. 28.
98. J.-C. Ravet, "Quel avenir," p. 11.
99. Ibid.
100. M.-A. Houle, "Splendeurs et misères de l'autonomie."
101. Boudreau and Keil, "La réconciliation de la démocratie locale," p. 98.
102. Boudreau and Keil, "La réconciliation de la démocratie locale," p. 97.
103. Côté and Simard, "De l'utopie radicale à la bonne gouvernance."